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Migrant Workers, ‘Modern Slavery’, and the Politics of 




This paper examines what gets represented when, by whom, and for what reasons in 
Italian tomato production. It begins with a snapshot of the tomato economy and 
provides an overview of our research into it. It then analyses the hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic representations of the Italian tomato, before offering our own, 
ethnographically informed alternative depiction of its production. The hegemonic 
image is associated with the Universal EXPO in Milan, painted and promoted by agro-
capital, global retail chains, and the state. It features a bucolic countryside bounteous 
with the fruits of ‘Italianità’ – a key ingredient of ‘Made in Italy’ branding – and 
contains no space for the migrant worker who is so central to the tomato harvest. The 
second, counter-hegemonic image is a direct response to this. Projected by civil society 
actors including labour unions, religious organisations and other ‘modern abolitionists’, 
it features labour front and centre, depicting a countryside full of ‘slaves’ and 
‘gangmasters’. Mobilising pity and shame in an effort to generate advocacy energy, it 
seeks to reform Italian agro-capitalism into an ethical alternative. The third image 
provides the basis of a critique of the previous two. It is drawn from ethnographic 
research with those at the foot of the tomato economy and emphasises the structural 
(rather than individual) violence of which their lives are an expression.  
 
Context and Research 
  
The tomato is a critical commodity within Italian agro-capitalism. Italy produces more 
tomatoes than anywhere in Europe, while only the US and China produce more 
worldwide. Around 90% of production is destined for industrial transformation, the 
majority for export. In 2013, exports totalled nearly €1.5 billioni, with primary 
destinations including Africa and the EU. Danish supermarkets source the majority of 
their tomato goods from Italy, while no less than 75% of the UK’s tomato imports are 
Italian (IEH and ETI 2013: 2).  
 
Tomatoes are generally grown in two Italian regions: Emilia-Romagna and the 
Capitanata Plain. Northern tomatoes are harvested predominantly by machine and 
processed by the major firms comprising the Northern industry association. Southern 
tomatoes are harvested mainly by hand and are processed by the many organisations 
comprising ANICAVii, the consortium of tomato processors generating annual revenues 
of €1.5 billion (IEH and ETI 2013).  
 
Although migrant workers never feature in the official iconography of the tomato, they 
play a significant role in its production. According to the national statistics office, 
161,000 foreign workers work in Southern Italian agriculture. This represents 16% of 
the official agricultural workforce (Perrotta 2015: 197), with the real number higher 
(Caritas 2015; Corrado 2011: 195). In summer, between 13,000 and 20,000 migrants 
come to Capitanata alone for work in the tomato harvest (Perrotta 2015: 198)iii.  
 
Our research into the tomato and the representative battles along its value chain took 
place in two phases. From January-June 2015, we familiarised ourselves with the 
business and civil society actors engaged in tomato valorisation. This involved mapping 
major market actors, reading reports and websites, interviewing representatives of 
trades associations, and visiting the Universal EXPO to analyse agro-capital’s 
paradigmatic self-presentation to the world. It also involved analysing myriad 
publications, websites, news reportages and documentaries produced by civil society 
actors struggling over the apparent ‘modern slavery’ of migrant labour at the bottom of 
the supply chain, as well as interviewing those whom Avallone terms ‘key informants’ 
within it (2013: 74). 
 
Our second phase was ethnographic, in and around the commune of Foggia, where we 
spent the 2015 tomato harvest. We chose Foggia as our case study for many reasons. 
First, it constitutes the epicentre of Italian tomato production. Puglia, the region of 
which it is part, produces one third of all Italian industrial tomatoes, while the province 
of which it is the capital produces more than any other in Europe (Fanizza 2013: 95). 
Foggia too plays host to Europe’s largest agricultural transformation plant and each 
year sends millions of tomatoes across the Appenini to Salerno, the heartland of Italy’s 
transformation industry.  
 
Second, Foggia hosts a massive agricultural migrant labour community. CGIL  
estimates that 40% of Foggia’s legally-registered agricultural workers are migrants, 
with the real figure likely to be higher. This makes Foggia the commune with the 
highest concentration of migrants in the entire country (Fanizza 2013: 95-7). 
Furthermore, although many of these workers reside permanently in and around the 
commune, their ranks are swelled every summer by the arrival of seasonal workers 
specifically for the tomato harvest.  
 
Third, the fate of Foggia’s migrant workers has generated major media and advocacy 
attention, becoming an iconic example of migrant exploitation in Italian agriculture and 
a progressive cause célèbre. The earliest NGO reports into living and working 
conditions date from the mid-2000s and feature sensational titles such as ‘A Season in 
Hell’ (Medici Senza Frontiere 2005). In 2006, Fabrizio Gatti wrote the decisive 
journalistic piece, ‘I Was a Tomato Slave in Puglia’iv, and this sparked a steady stream 
of reports painting the migrant experience in stark colours resonant of many within the 
contemporary battle against ‘modern slavery’. One of the key signifiers in these 
depictions is the informal settlement of Rignano Garganico, outside Foggia town, 
which is home to many seasonal labourers and is known as ‘Il Gran Ghetto’. 
 
Fourth, Foggia represents a privileged site for investigation, in that it has received some 
scholarly attention from the handful of respected social scientists interested in these 
questions and yet has never been studied exhaustively by any one. Authors such as 
Perrotta (2013, 2014, 2014b 2015), Corrado (2011, 2013), Colloca (2013), Fanizzi 
(2013), Peano (2017), Dines and Rigo (2015, 2015) have all conducted important work 
in or around Foggia, but only Perrotta, Peano, Dines and Rigo have, to our knowledge, 
spent time in the Ghetto or spoken at length to the various actors involved at the lower 
echelons of the tomato economy.  
 
Our research in and around the Ghetto involved interviews, participant observation and 
unstructured conversations. We observed living and working conditions among those 
involved in the tomato harvest, made friends with permanent and transient residents, 
and were invited into people’s ‘homes’. We interviewed representatives of almost all 
‘classes’ engaged in tomato production, including (seasonal) workers, labour brokers 
and respected figures in the Ghetto community. Outside the Ghetto, we observed and 
interviewed local government and civil society actors, landowning farmers, and farmer 
associations. In total, we interviewed over 40 people – including 25 migrant workers – 
and conducted informal interviews with many more. Our questions sought to make 
sense of the local organisation of labour, possibilities for labour resistance, trajectories 
into and out of the Ghetto and its harvest economy, power distributions in, around and 
beyond the Ghetto, relationships between actors differently situated along the value 
chain, and ‘strategic thinking’ on the part of civil society.  
 
Hegemonic Imagery: Italian Pastoral  
 
The dominant image of the Italian tomato is that presented in commercials. Its 
components are pastoral and domestic, including bucolic vistas, jars of produce, busy 
kitchens, and happy families. Italian politics and agri-business spend tens of millions 
of euros promoting this image, and the global retail firms to which Italian agro-capital 
sells recycle it when they stock Italian products on their shelves. It forms part of, and 
trades on, the ‘Made in Italy’ brand, mobilising notions of ‘Italian-ness’, quality, beauty 
and taste (Barthes 1964). Although it has long been ubiquitous, it reached its apex at 
the national-cultural, political-economic festa that was the 2015 Universal EXPO in 
Milan, organised around the theme of ‘Food’. Over the following section, we will trace 
the lines of this image using the illustrative lens of EXPO, and in particular its agri-
business-sponsored pavilion, ‘CIBUS è ITALIA’v.  
 
An EXPO ‘Made in Italy’ 
 
In his foreword to the seminal volume, International Marketing and the Country of 
Origin Effect: The Global Impact of ‘Made in Italy’, Nicolas Papadopoulos writes that 
‘the importance of made-in to Italy and of Italy to made-in is both self-evident and 
reasonably well understood, in Italy and elsewhere’ (in Bertoli and Resciniti 2012: xi). 
This is because – as scholars of ‘terroir’ have long shown us (Trubek 2008) – ‘where a 
product is made is [about] much more than “where a product is made”’ (ibid. xi). It is 
about the creation and activation of the mental schemata structuring experience in and 
beyond the marketplace. ‘Mental schemata’ are extrinsically-cued short-cuts allowing 
us to explain complex phenomena in terms of easily accessible, stereotyped 
associations. They are what tells us that that a Ferrari is better than a Mazda ‘without 
needing to do the research’ (ibid.), or that Italy ‘just means’ ‘craftsmanship’ and ‘high-
quality products’ (Weibel-Orlando 2011: 264). In Papadopoulos’ words, ‘Country of 
origin, or a place’s made-in image, is one of the most powerful extrinsic cues in 
existence’ (in Bertoli and Resciniti 2012: xi). The global branding of ‘place’, therefore, 
is integral to the workings of global capitalism.  
 
Italian business knows this very well, and – along with the Italian state – spends vast 
sums ensuring that the rest of us do too (Pratesi 2001). This was everywhere in evidence 
at EXPO – conceived, in the words of former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, as ‘a 
chance to show [the world] brand Italia’vi, and thus to provide capital Italia with ‘a 
unique business opportunity’vii. Its classic expression, at least from the perspective of 
this paper, came with the agri-business pavilion, CIBUS è Italia, built by the Italian 
Food Industry Federation. Federalimentare describes itself as the ‘official global 
ambassador of Made in Italy’, collectively responsible for an annual turnover of €133 
billion and for exports of over €26 billionviii. Its promotional video, available on its and 
on the EXPO websites, proudly declared that ‘Italy is food, food is Italy’. It described 
its pavilion as ‘dedicated to the excellence of food Made in Italy’ and to those ingenious 
businesses and growers spreading ‘the quality produced by our country’. It would play 
host to business delegations from around the world with a view to expanding exports, 
leading them through ‘an authentic food experience’. 
 
Picture 2: Tomatoes on the CIBUS è Italia Twitter Feed 
 
 Source: Screenshot of the CIBUS è Italia Twitter Feedix 
 
But just how ‘authentic’ was that experience? Unsurprisingly, not very, for it presented 
a highly sanitised picture of agro-industrial and socio-cultural harmony using display-
cases and upbeat promotional videos. The first were highly fetishising, featuring 
finished secondary commodities such as tins of pelati or stacks of tomatoes wet with 
morning dew. While the second were fantasistic: each video followed the same 
progression, using the metaphor of the lifecycle to document the journey ‘from field to 
fork’. The narratives began with the planting of the tomato seedling, moving through 
the harvest and factory-setting of industrialised transformation, before ending at a 
(white, wealthy) table. In the process, a hyper-organised system of production, 
accumulation and exploitation was equated with the natural and the harmonious, a cross 
between the pastoral, hyper-modern and traditional. Yet what was absent, of course, 
was that which is of greatest interest to this paper: no videos depicted the physical 
difficulty of the tomato harvest and none featured a single black face. All people 
presented were white, and all were either working in harmony at the interface of nature 
and heavy machinery, or at table about to be fed by a stereotyped Italian nonna. 
 




 Source: Authors 
 
This cannot but recall Marx’s famous take on ‘commodity fetishism’. In Capital, 
Volume One, Marx bemoans the ‘mystery of commodities, the magic and necromancy 
that surrounds the products of labour’ (1976: 169). ‘This finished form of the world of 
commodities’, he complains, ‘conceals the social character of private labour and the 
social relations between the individual workers’ (ibid. 168-9). It hides the materiality 
of living labour (with)in the commodity form and (with)in that commodity’s marketing 
and exchange. The worker’s presence is subsumed and only her ‘trace’ remains 
(Derrida 1976) – and of this the iconography of the Italian tomato is a paradigmatic 
example. It erases the worker whose labour holds up the supply-chain, veiling the grit, 
grime and graft of production, hiding it both within the final-form commodity and 
beneath its ‘Made in Italy’ branding. Given how important ‘values’ are as well as 
‘quality’ to Made in Italy (Weibel-Orlando 2011: 266), it is fair to suggest that such 
mystification is necessary for the maintenance of the brand itselfx. 
 
Counter-Hegemonic Imagery: Sensationalised Brutality 
 
By contrast, no such mystification is at work in the production of the counter-
hegemonic image. This is the dialectical opposite of the first – over-emphasising the 
migrant worker’s suffering to the extent that the hegemonic image erases his presence. 
Constructed and presented by the forces of civil society – consumer groups, liberal 
sections of mainstream media, labour unions and NGOs – it emphasises extreme and 
individualised degradation and exploitation, in the hope that this will mobilise business 
shame, governmental action, and consumer anger and pity. The image – as can be seen 
in certain of the examples below – relies heavily on sensationalist portrayals of 
suffering, sadness and exploitation, and deploys the emotive signifier of ‘(modern) 
slavery’. Its core emphases are 1) migrant workers’ difficult living conditions, and 2) 
the violence and brutality that are said to sustain their abuse.  
 
Picture 4: Screenshot image of inside a Ghetto dwelling 
 Source: Piazza Pulitaxi  
 
Both of these emphases echo the consumer–centred struggles against historical trans-
Atlantic slavery (Glickman 2009) and for today’s ‘fair’ or ‘ethical’ trade (Hilton 2009, 
Ch. 4, Anderson 2015, Ch. 5, Barry 2004). The former aims to generate a ‘politics of 
pity’ (Aradau 2004), engendering sympathy in viewers in the hope that this will spark 
outrage and intervention. The latter aims to shame the major businesses benefitting 
from exploitation and the governments whose inaction allows them to do so. Both 
deploy affect to incite ‘practical interventions…that envisage a re-structuring of the 
existing situation’ (Aradau 2004: 254-6), presenting a version of ‘suffering [that is] 
recognisable, something spectators can identify and sympathise with’. They also 
construct it as undeserved, ‘since pity cannot be experienced towards the culpable and 
the dangerous’ (ibid. 258-9; Boltanski 1999). Accordingly, they deploy simplistic 
narratives of responsibility which reinforce the binary between guilt and innocence 
(O’Connell Davidson 2015).  
 
A good example of the first element of this strategy comes in the news report, ‘Piazza 
Pulita’, from which the screenshots above and below are takenxii. Piazza Pulita is a 
current affairs programme taking more ‘humane’ stances on illegal immigration and 
labour exploitation.  
 
Picture 5: Screenshot of migrant workers showing Ghetto sanitation. 
 
 Source: Piazza Pulitaxiii  
 
The episode examining Foggia’s tomato harvest begins with a backdrop of the rapidly 
setting sun, darkness rising against a soundtrack of sinister music. ‘In order to visit 
these Ghettos’, the presenter whispers, ‘you need to come at night. Migrants don’t want 
cameras here, because they’re scared that the police will come and chase them off’. The 
camera cuts to a pile of burning plastic, the narrator coughing to underline the point. 
Soon we see run-down portakabins with dirty toilets, and the narrator underscores the 
irony of surviving the Mediterranean crossing only to end up here.  
 
Picture 6: Screenshot of the Gran Ghetto. 
 Source: Piazza Pulitaxiv  
 
The next Ghetto we see is the Gran Ghetto, where we conducted our fieldwork. This 
segment also begins with darkness and sinister music. ‘In this banlieue’, the narrator 
opines, ‘there are men who’ve escaped war, escaped hunger’. ‘Look at us’, one 
interjects, ‘look at how we live’. The camera shifts to close-ups: DIY-sewers, open 
ditches, shacks covered in plastic to protect against the rain. A Burkinabe describes his 
difficulties and the segment finishes with him lamenting the family the left behind, his 
children unable to go to school. Both his story and the accompanying images evoke 
pity at his and his peers’ powerlessness. The tropes of innocence, suffering and 
deprivation, plus the focus on the familiar, all tell that what is at stake is ‘humanity’, 
and the fact that people ‘like us’ are suffering, defenceless in our midst. 
 




 Source: Radio Onda Urtoxv 
 
The second element of the counter-hegemonic image emphasises exploitation. Its 
targets are: 1) the individuals directly exploiting migrant workers; 2) the big businesses 
indirectly responsible for that exploitation because they sit atop the supply chains 
incorporating their labour; and 3) the Italian government, whose inaction makes it 
indirectly responsible for everything. It works primarily to elicit shame on the part of 
those deemed responsible, and anger on the part of everyone else.  
 
Two key signifiers are central to it. First is ‘schiavitù’ – ‘slavery’ – as the status to 
which migrant workers are apparently reduced when working in the Italian tomato 
harvest. Second is ‘caporalato’ – the system of gang labour brokerage organising much 
of Southern Italian agriculture and said to be directly responsible for reducing these 
workers to slavery and thus putting their labour at the service of unscrupulous corporate 
accumulation. Caporalato and schiavitù form a dyad within the counter-hegemonic 
imaginary and are well illustrated by the flagship civil society campaign, ‘Stop 
Caporalato’.  
 
‘Stop Caporalato’ is organised by the agricultural branch of the CGIL labour union, in 
alliance with other civil society bodies, consumer groups and religious organisations 
committed to eradicating modern slavery. It builds on a long history of agricultural 
labour activism and draws on a well-established verbal and visual rhetoric. The image 
above, which is associated with it, echoes the imagery of anti-slavery consumer 
activists in the Nineteenth Century – even including the slightly ‘grainy’ pixilation. 
Black hands are raised in supplication, their enslavement denoted by being bound, and 
the agricultural root of this binding signified by the tomato vine that forms a chain 
around their wrists. 
 
A textual parallel is found on the webpage announcing the launch of the campaign: 
  
‘This campaign is necessary if we are to punish the terrible crime of 
caporalato. Gang masters are especially widespread in agriculture and in 
construction, both sectors employing hundreds of thousands of workers, 
especially migrants, who are stripped of their rights and reduced to the 
condition of slavery’xvi. 
 
The language here is emphatic, violent and direct and is repeated consistently in 
articlesxvii, reportsxviii and interviewsxix across the media landscape. A classic case of 
the politics of shame, it follows time-honoured tactics in the anti-corporate and 
consumer activist struggle. That is,  it presents extreme yet individualised exploitation, 
characterises this as the equivalent of (modern) slavery. aims to embarrasses the absent 
government for not protecting the innocent, and tries to shame the businesses 
benefitting from what it sees as injustice. As CGIL’s roving organiser put it to us:  
 
‘Our logic is to “hit one and show them all”. As with Apple or Nike, we 
know that if we can show how much their supply chains use slave labour 
and caporalato, we can embarrass them. We can force them to accept a law 
on supply chain transparency, and we can force the government to act by 
banning caporalato’. 
 
Such thinking is far from unique. As much of the highest profile literature on modern 
slavery suggests (Bales 1999, 2005, Kara 2010), this is a preferred tactic among many 
modern abolitionists (Page 2014, Kempadoo 2015), in line with other consumer activist 
approaches (Hilton 2009, Littler 2009, Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014, Anderson 2015). 
Be they pro- or anti-corporate, the strategy adopted works to elicit emotional-moral 
responses in the hope that this will incite actions for change (Page 2014, Kempadoo 
2015). 
 
An Ethnographic Alternative 
 
However, while we do not doubt the good intentions behind these efforts, our research 
persuades us that there are problems with them. Two are paramount. First, according to 
the migrants with whom we spent time, the images they rely upon are highly reductive 
and far from representative. The iconography of pity and extremity (mis-)represents 
migrant workers as agency-less victims caught in traps not of their own making. This 
objectification not only alienates the people it seeks to assist; it arguably precludes a 
more grounded politics of solidarity, fostering instead the kind of objectification that 
typically underpins damaging disciplinary interventions (Manzo 2008, O’Connell 
Davidson 2015, Walters 2017). Second, in our view, for all their intended critical bite, 
these efforts remain limited, in that their reliance on discourses of extremity and 
individuality reproduces the idea that exploitation is epiphenomenal rather than integral 
to the market. As such, they serve an unwittingly hegemonic function, reinforcing the 
power of major market actors by de-politicising the market itself (Howard 2018). Over 
the rest of this section, we aim to paint a more complex and contradictory picture of life 
at the lower echelons of the tomato economy, pointing in the process to an alternative 
approach to activism around it.  
 
The Social Organisation of Tomato Production in Foggiaxx 
 
The chain of actors involved in the Foggian harvest economy begins with the multi-
national retailers who sell to Western consumers. These firms structure the lower levels 
of the tomato supply chain and their power is felt in nearly every socio-economic 
interaction within it because they are price-settersxxi. Collectively, they take €0.83 out 
of every €1 made from the sale of tomato-based supermarket products. The next level 
in the chain – the Italian agro-industrial firms processing harvested tomatoes into 
passata, pelati, or salsa – take around €0.10, leaving everyone else a share of merely 
€0.07. 
 
Various different classes populate the ‘ground-level’ world of the tomato harvest. First 
are the landowning Italian farmers. They supply the capital inputs for the production of 
millions of tonnes of tomatoes across tens of thousands of hectares, which they sell to 
agro-industry for transformation. The price negotiation between farmer and industry is 
sometimes conducted by representative associations and is typically fraught, even if 
both ultimately depend on the prices set by the retailers. Although farmers and industry 
do deal directly with each other, they are physically and sociologically separated by the 
pivotal class of the transporters, who collect harvested tomatoes in specially fitted 
lorries before transporting them across Southern Italy.  
 
The manual labour of the harvest is organised by the farmer and the labour-broker – the 
caporale, in counter-hegemonic terms. His role is fundamental, because he is 
responsible for scheduling the various different fields, sourcing the necessary workers, 
transporting them to and from the often isolated farms, and ensuring that they complete 
the harvest. The harvest is conducted predominantly by hand. Although machines are 
increasingly common, the majority of Foggian tomatoes are still picked manually, since 
better quality tomatoes are often damaged by harvesters. Workers are therefore 
necessary in large numbers for the intense period lasting from August through 
September. These workers – like their caporali – come mainly from either the eastern 
edge of the EU (Bulgaria and Romania) or from the various countries of West Africa. 
The EU citizens are in Italy legally (though their work is mostly informal), while the 
West Africans are divided into those who have papers (ranging from long-term 
residents to those awaiting asylum decisions) and those who do not (who have either 
arrived in Italy illegally or overstayed, having once been in regola). Although 
Europeans and Africans interact in the fields, the labour gangs are never mixed, with 
caporali mobilising workers according to personal contacts and, therefore, race. 
 
Places like the Gran Ghetto are where many migrant workers spend their time. They 
are also home to the final class involved in the local tomato economy – the service 
provider class, which has emerged and built itself up around the itinerant population. 
These people run the many restaurants, bars, shops, and brothels operating especially 
in summer. A sizeable proportion of them are women, mostly in their 40s or 50s, who 
have been in Italy for a long time and are now transforming places like the Ghetto from 
seasonal tent cities into semi-permanent settlements in which African migrants seek 
social, cultural and financial solace. 
 
Money Makes it Worth It 
 
The work of the tomato harvest is unquestionably hard, involving long, physically 
demanding hours bent double under the blazing Foggian sun. For some, it is too much 
– a typical work-day will begin at 4am, and can last anywhere up to 8pm. Workers work 
in groups that vary in size from a handful to over a dozen. They typically receive 
between €3 and €3.50 per cassone of harvested tomatoes, and will commonly seek to 
fill ten cassoni a day. Some say that the caporale earns a small sum for each filled 
cassone, though others deny it. In any case, of the €30 to €35 that migrant workers 
(should) take home for each day’s work, between €2.50 and €5 goes to the caporale to 
cover the ‘costs’ of transport to and from the fields. No-one involved in the harvest – 
including the caporale – gets paid immediately. Payment is delayed for everyone until 
industry receives its goods. Industry then pays the farmer, who pays the caporale, who 
pays the workers. This chain of payment, with all the delays it entails, necessarily offers 
opportunities for exploitation.  
 
Structural conditions make work here anything from an acceptable to a desirable option 
for most migrant workers. Plenty consider themselves to be exploited, but none that we 
know of considers himself a modern slave, since all point to their circumstances (rather 
than any individual) as the primary coercive force they face. All of these men are 
relatively poor and need money to achieve their goals. For most, these include fulfilling 
the social and moral obligation to send money back to their relatives. But doing so 
regularly is made difficult by a combination of Italian economic stagnation, racism, and 
the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the legal right to work. As such, 
‘hustling’ at harvest time is often the best option they have – and many travel from all 
over Italy to take it, before heading elsewhere for another harvest season. 
 
Sekore is a good example. He is Malian, from the Kayes region, and 25 years old. An 
orphan, he is the oldest of three siblings and came here from Libya, where he previously 
spent time in construction. ‘Of course work in the fields is hard’, he said when we asked 
about conditions. ‘It’s also true that we’re exploited. But I’m strong, and I came here 
to work’. In the month he spent in the Ghetto, he worked almost every day, filling an 
average of ten tomato boxes per day at €3 per box. This meant that after deducting €5 
for transport and another €5 for food, he made around €500 during the harvest. For his 
brothers, likely among the 50% of Malians living on less than $1.25/day, €500 would 
be enough for months. While for Sekore, it was enough to meet his basic needs, put 
some aside, and send some back. 
 
Case Study 1: Abdoulaye 
 
Abdoulaye is Senegalese. He has been in Europe for 18 years, spending most of his 
time in Italy. At first he worked for a small company in Bergamo until it closed in 2002. 
He stayed on doing odd jobs, returned to Senegal for few months, and eventually 
decided to go to the UK. He lived in London for two and an half years, working mostly 
as a security guard. ‘It was good’, he says, ‘I was paid well’. Yet eventually he had to 
return to Italy to renew his papers. From friends he heard that one can easily find work 
in agriculture in Foggia and so decided to come down for the summer. Currently, he is 
living in an abandoned house at the entrance of the Ghetto with a group of other 
Senegalese men. ‘I work in the fields’, he says. ‘The work is very harsh, but I cannot 
complain. Also if I am too tired I just do not work’. Abdoulaye makes around €5 per 
box of tomatoes and also does various other odd jobs around the harvest. Because he 
speaks Italian and has papers, his options are greater than many of those who stay in 
the Ghetto. We ask him whether he considers life here to be like slavery. ‘People here 
try to do their best’, he says. ‘Some are exploited more than others, but in the end things 
are tough for most of us. Take me for example: after 18 years in Italy I am here working 
hard for very little money and without a proper contract. But that’s what I’ve decided 
to do’. Because it is better than the alternative, which he describes as ‘sitting around in 
Bergamo doing nothing all day’. At least here, he notes, ‘I can spend my evenings 




Much maligned, the caporali play a fundamental intermediary role in the harvest of the 
Southern Italian tomato, valorising both their socio-cultural capital and their 
positionality as socio-cultural and economic intermediaries (Howard 2017). Unlike 
most of the migrant workers they put to work, they speak Italian and can communicate 
with farmers, while unlike farmers, they speak West African languages and can 
communicate with migrant workers. Many also have papers and are thus able to present 
a veneer of legality. Caporali typically spend weeks planning the harvests, organising 
which field to pick on what day and with how many workers. They cultivate 
relationships, liaise with farmers, build teams, and organise transport. Although they 
always extract surpluses, their role is so important that it is fair to say there would be 
no harvest and no money for anyone without them, which migrant workers commonly 
admit when blaming ‘the system’ more than its individual manifestations. 
 
Yet caporali do often abuse the structural power they possess. None of the workers we 
interviewed, for example, views them with much fondness and everyone has a story 
about how – and for how much – he was held over a barrel by one of them. This is 
because caporali ultimately get to choose who works when, deciding the fate of 
thousands desperate for work. And this, in turn, enables them to impose conditions on 
workers that workers have to comply with in order to remain in favour. Common 
examples include paying for transport or buying food from the caporale’s preferred 
Ghetto restaurant. Alternatively, it can mean accepting €3 per box of tomatoes on one 
day and €3.50 on another. 
 
Claims of violence, however, are often overblown. For one thing, migrant workers in 
Foggia are all young men with a strong sense of right and wrong and violence on the 
part of a caporale would possibly be met with violence. Workers and caporali also live 
together in the Ghetto amidst moral communities that place limits on violence and 
regulate exploitation. More fundamentally though is the fact that physical coercion is 
simply unnecessary: ‘dull compulsion’ alone is enough to maintain labour discipline, 
because every migrant present needs work, many are without papers, and in a context 
of crisis and social marginalisation, few have better alternatives. It is exactly this which 
makes labour organising so difficult. We asked countless migrant workers whether they 
could combine and militate for higher daily rates, and to a man they said that doing so 
is impossible, ‘because there’ll always be a hundred others running behind us to take 
whatever is offered’. In this regard, caporali are better understood as facilitators of an 
unjust system than as architects of systemic injustice.  
 
Case Study 2: Arfa 
 
Arfa is an Ivorian national in his late 40s. He comes from a ‘political family’ in Abidjan, 
and has been in Italy for 20 years. He is here legally and is one of the elders of the 
Ghetto community. He is a major labour-broker, and also owns one of the most vibrant, 
sport-watching bars in the Ghetto, with his European wife and their children. We met 
and bonded over football; and over the weeks we talked again and again. 
 
A major theme in all of our discussions is the dominant modern abolitionist discourse 
around caporali. For all its material lack, the Ghetto is a hyper-connected place. And 
Arfa, along with all the other established Ghetto figures, knows about this discourse. 
They read it online and see political, civil society, and union figures pronouncing it on 
TV. It enrages them – and the union representative who is most vocal in spreading it 
locally is now consequently a persona non grata in the Ghetto. ‘These guys mobilise 
stereotypes and scapegoats because it suits their purposes’, Arfa complains. ‘It attracts 
attention for their campaigns, and it attracts funding for them’. 
 
In Arfa’s understanding, the caporale should be understood more as a ‘guide’ and as a 
‘facilitator’. His role is one of mediation and organisation. He has his contacts and he 
brings people to work. He is someone who has a car, is legal, and speaks Italian. He 
goes around and asks farmers for work, then he plans the schedule and brings workers 
to do the job. He may earn a bit extra for his services and some more for transport. But 
he never siphons off people’s money. The people he puts to work are mostly people he 
knows and trusts. But of course, he underlines, the caporale is human – a human like 
anybody else – and when a young man comes crying desperate for work, he will be 
helped. ‘No one will go hungry here’, we are told. 
 
As if to emphasise this point, he tells a story that elicits nods of pride from around the 
table. Last month a very well-dressed young man drove up to the Ghetto looking for 
Arfa. He was Malian, and he had become very successful over the past few years in 
Paris. He had come to Arfa to show his gratitude. Because eight years ago, when this 
young man had first arrived in Italy and knew no-one, he came to the Ghetto hungry, 
desperate, and lonely. Arfa found him in tears and shared his food with him. He then 
found the boy work. ‘I never forgot that kindness’, the boy is said to have said on his 
return. 
 
‘What would really help people here?’, we ask Arfa. The answers are simple: ‘Give 
everyone papers, give them work, and leave them alone’. 
 
The Ghetto As Hard But ‘Home’ 
 
The Gran Ghetto can be a hard place to live and is not to be romanticised. Domenico 
Perrotta does not exaggerate when describing living and working conditions as 
‘amongst the worst in Europe’ (Perrotta 2014b: 193). Hot, dusty and dry in summer; in 
winter, freezing cold and wet. Residents live in drafty wooden buildings, dispose of 
waste by burning it, and have limited water and sanitation facilities, provided 
irregularly by local authorities. Additionally, it can be a place of segregation: spatially, 
in that it is isolated and far from public transport; economically, since almost no-one 
there can access regular employment; and culturally, because migrants have next to no 
interaction with the Italian community beyond the farmers they encounter on the way 
to the fields (Perrotta and Sacchetto 2013: 58). 
 
But the Ghetto is also far more than this. For many thousands of West Africans, it is at 
once a home, a refuge, and a place where money can be made. Few residents are able 
to find regular employment elsewhere, and yet all live under the constant pressure to 
fulfil social duties by remitting money to families waiting across the Mediterranean. 
The Ghetto gives them a chance; it provides a material-social base from which to 
potentially access the underpaid, exploited, but better-than-nothing opportunities 
characteristic of much seasonal labour under capitalism. Moreover, it allows them to 
save money, since it is often the only place where they can find cheap and flexible 
accommodation, as well as access important services such as healthcare or legal 
counselling, through NGOs. 
 
More than this, the Ghetto offers residents solidarity, social support, and a socio-
cultural environment at once comfortingly familiar, largely beyond the reach of the law, 
and protectively far from the racist scrutiny of urban Italy. As one of its elder statesmen 
put it, ‘Guys come here because there’s solidarity. No one goes hungry, and here they’re 
at home. This isn’t like being in Rome or Milan; here people are friends. It’s like being 
in Africa’. And in many ways it is like being in Africa – it looks like countless peri-
urban spaces dotted across that continent, with streets full of bikes, dogs and stalls, bars 
blasting Ivorian music, buvettes serving pâte, and football everywhere on TV. 
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This matters to Ghetto residents. Ibrahim, another young Malian, put it bluntly when 
he said: ‘What the hell are you going to do in Milan on your own, with no work, no 
shelter, and no friends? Even if you struggle to find work here – which many do – you 
at least have company, you have people from where you are from, you are at home’. 
The importance and attraction of this simply cannot be underestimated in a land where 
men like him are visibly and legally ‘outsiders’. 
 
Case Study 3: Pierrette 
 
Maman Pierrette is an important figure in the Ghetto, splitting her time between there 
and Naples. In what she describes as her ‘past life’, she was married.   
Her husband was a smuggler, and according to Pierrette a dangerous man. He used to 
bring women in from Nigeria, was very violent, and eventually made off with all their 
money. Pierrette eventually set up alone in Naples, a city she describes as hard, but 
welcoming. ‘There are people of many colours and classes, and there is work to do’. 
Like her mother, she is often a cleaner and a carer, while her youngest son goes to the 
local school. 
 
Summer is when Pierrette comes to Foggia, or more precisely to the Ghetto, and bit by 
bit she is expanding her business in it. On one of the afternoons we meet, her restaurant 
is a building site because she has claimed lots of old wood dumped by a local Italian 
and decided to build a shop with it at the front of her bar. 
 
Pierrette feeds on average 30 men a day, Ibrahim being one of them, and more spend 
their down time in the bar drinking beer, smoking or chatting. Her son runs around with 
them and the many other children here for the summer. ‘No’, she says, when we ask if 
she plans to let him work in the harvest, ‘it’s too tough. And he also has all the 
opportunities to do better – school, money, connections’. Her oldest children in 
Cameroon have gone to university and are becoming professionals, so her middle class 




It is somewhat self-evident that major market actors fetishize production, obfuscate 
exploitation, and hide the lived realities of labour in their pursuit of profit. In the age of 
‘ethical capitalism’ (Barry 2004), image is understood to be essential, and the 
hegemonic imagery discussed in this paper contributes to the maintenance of the Italian 
businesses valorising both the tomato and the Made-in-Italy brand. But this paper 
argues that the counter-hegemonic pushback against this fetishization is itself also 
highly problematic. Because although undoubtedly well-intentioned, it is at times 
simplistic, alienating, depoliticising, and potentially damaging.  
 
Alienation is everywhere in evidence in the Ghetto. Despite her claims, the Piazza 
Pulita journalist mentioned above almost certainly did not film at night because 
residents feared the police; she did so because during the day people would have chased 
her away. ‘We’re fed up with people coming here like that’, one Ghetto resident told 
us, ‘taking pictures like we’re zoo animals and then writing whatever crap they like’. 
Outsiders are routinely distrusted in the Ghetto, whether they be journalists, 
representatives of the authorities, or researchers. Perhaps most telling is the way that 
residents speak of the CGIL union officers who visit in the hope of fostering a labour 
movement. ‘They’re assholes out for themselves’, one man said, ‘and they’re not 
welcome. They call us slaves on TV, and they do so for their own gain’.  
 
Inherent to the politics of pity and shame described above is a kind of objectification 
(Burman 1994, Manzo 2008). Although the signifier of slavery is clearly successful in 
bringing campaigners welcome media attention, its use also inevitably angers many of 
the people who end up being labelled as slaves. Because the word ‘slave’ is typically 
associated with shame (Patterson 1982) and its accompanying tales of victimhood deny 
people their humanity, reducing the complexity of their lives to one-dimensional 
accounts of suffering. In this respect, the humanitarian, modern abolitionist gaze should 
itself be seen as a form of fetishization, constructed by looking at people rather than 
with them, and abstracting them from the messiness of their contexts (Burman 1994, 
Manzo 2008).  
 
Worse still, this objectification has a tendency to foster unhelpful, unwelcome, 
disciplinary interventions that are destructive of socio-economic coping mechanisms 
and harmful to meaningful relationships. As was documented in the now-classic 2007 
report, Collateral Damage, anti-trafficking interventions have a long history of 
destructively acting on people rather than with them (Dottridge 2007),  and that history 
is repeating itself in the age of modern abolitionism (Bernstein 2010, O’Connell 
Davidson 2015, Walters 2017). In turn, it repeats an even older history documented in 
critical studies of ‘development’ (e.g. Escobar 1995, Li 2007). In this case, it is 
exemplified by a recent attempt to protect African labour migrants in Foggia by closing 
the Ghetto down and moving its residents on. Unsurprisingly, the ‘beneficiaries’ of this 
intervention neither welcomed nor accepted it and a number were injured in their 
attempts to resist. As part of the chaos that subsequently ensued, a fire broke out and 
two migrants died. Much of the Ghetto has now already been rebuilt.  
 
What of de-politicisation? What systemic features are hidden by the reductive 
simplicity of the counter-hegemonic image? First, the fundamental importance of 
capitalism’s ‘dull compulsion’. Second, the existence of a socio-legal system creating 
‘disfigured persons’ in Italy (and across Europe) excluded from the rights of full 
citizenship (Best and Hartman 2005; see also Anderson 2013, O’Connell Davidson and 
Okyere 2016). And third, the power dynamics governing value-capture along the 
tomato value chain which structure labour relations at its base.  
 
On the first point, it will be obvious to most readers that no ‘real’ dividing line exists 
between free and forced labour, because unless you control the means of your own 
reproduction, your (waged) labour will always be somewhat forced from you (see, for 
example, Banaji 2003, Lerche 2007). This structural coercion is obfuscated when 
exploitative work gets characterised as ‘(modern) slavery’ because that characterisation 
renders the normality of compulsion and exploitation discursively exceptional, and 
therefore outside the implicitly just world of ‘free’ market exchange (Page 2014, 
Kempadoo 2015, O’Connell Davidson 2015, Howard 2017). Second, migrant workers 
are so exploitable within Italian agriculture in part because they are denied the rights of 
European citizens. Other than the few who have papers, most have no recourse to public 
funds, no access to healthcare, and no legal protections in the labour market. They thus 
represent the classic neoliberal reserve army integral to agricultural regimes like the 
Italian (Peano 2017, LeBaron et al. 2018). Third, the scapegoating focus on the 
individual ‘folk devil’ caporali (Weitzer 2007) distracts us from those who really hold 
power within this field – the Tescos and Carrefours at the apex of consumer society. 
These retailers are so big and their supply chains so integrated that they determine the 
distribution of value across the chain (Kaplinksy 2005, Lichtenstein 2010, Clapp 2012). 
The results are predictable – farmers are barely able to make ends meet and in order to 
stay in business they have  to rely on illegal, underpaid, migrant labour. In this context, 
exploitable labour such as that provided by the Gran Ghetto should be seen as a 




Global retail capital, and in particular the Italian agro-capital with which it collaborates, 
fight hard to hide the realities of labour exploitation on their path to profit. They are 
largely successful. Tomatoes and tomato-based products earn hundreds of millions 
every year, as indeed do the many other agricultural commodities central to Italy’s 
economy. The Italian state is well aware of this, and it works hard to preserve the 
corporate branding of Made in Italy quality, with the EXPO only the latest and loudest 
example of its efforts. 
 
Yet what we depict as the counter-hegemonic response is gaining traction across the 
public and political spheres. An impressive advocacy tradition has been built using the 
politics of pity and shame in Italy as elsewhere and it brings together humanitarian 
NGOs, labour unions, consumer campaigners, and other modern abolitionists. The 
success of their efforts is evidenced in the many news reports depicting Italy’s 
‘agricultural slaves’ or calling for an end to caporalato and the creation of more ‘ethical 
agriculture’. Further still, a law has been passed outlawing caporalato and making 
farmers liable for using caporali.  
 
Does this signify a turning of the tide towards ‘ethical capitalism’? We are sceptical. 
As Page has pointed out, ‘ethical capitalism’ is the classic consumer capitalist response 
to relations of exploitation. It enables activists to ‘do something’ about the problem 
whilst protecting themselves from confronting the structures that engender it (2014). 
Even where it results in legal developments, it individualises causality, and in turn 
promotes technical, market-friendly ‘fixes’ that leave fundamental imbalances in 
wealth and power unaddressed. In this regard, it can be seen to constitute a ‘fetishized 
de-fetishization’ (Littler and Moor in Page 2014: 3), which ultimately entrenches the 
status quo by presenting it as technically perfectible (Littler 2009, Anderson 2015).  
 
This suggests that the pity- and shame-heavy counter-hegemonic politics discussed in 
this article are limited. And in turn it begs the question of which alternatives may be 
superior. Our contention is that pity and shame should be replaced by structural critique. 
Civil society is certainly right to draw attention to the injustices represented by the 
Ghetto’s existence; but it would be better doing so in systemic fashion, critiquing the 
whole system of which the Ghetto is an expression. This includes the Italian migration 
regime, its border policies, and the neoliberal governance of its agro-capitalism. 
Critique must transcend the simplistic scapegoating of individualised ‘folk devil’ 
baddies (Weitzer 2007) and mobilise resistance within and beyond existing relations of 
production. 
 
At the same time, and perhaps more urgently, civil society should approach these 
workers and ask them what they think they need. They will likely say what they have 
said to us: better sanitation, waste disposal, a bus service linking the Ghetto to the town, 
and support in setting up credit unions. All of these are basic steps that could improve 
the Ghetto’s immediate conditions, and in turn form the basis of a strategy built with 
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